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Attested Tool-Server Admission: A Security Extension to the Model Context Protocol

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arXiv:2605. 24248v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how a large-language-model (LLM) agent and an external tool server exchange messages, but not trust: a host reads a server's self-declared tool list and dispatches calls, with no notion of which servers it may use, at what sensitivity, or which of a server's tools are in bounds.

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Authors: Alfredo Metere
Released: 2026-05-26 (2mo ago)
Topic: Related to current project
Relation to my work: Read next because Attested Tool-Server Admission: A Security Extension to the Model Context Protocol overlaps with clean result "LoRA persona trained on <A> alone emits <B> at 23.5% when a co-trained partner learns <A>...<B>, vs 0% control on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Leakage rate is a usable signal for recovering trigger-shaped phrases on Gaperon-1125-1B without knowing the hidden trigger itself (MODERATE confidence)", clean result "Language-mismatch LoRA SFT on Qwen2.5-7B leaks the trained completion language into bystander directives the model was never trained on, absent under same-language SFT (LOW confidence)". Matching terms: text, eval, source, line, rate, without, test, language. Source: arxiv cs.CR (Cryptography and Security).
arXiv: 2605.24248

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