Read next because Defense Against Prompt Inversion Attacks: An Information-Theoretic Approach for LLM Collaborative Inference overlaps with clean result "Language-mismatch LoRA SFT on Qwen2.5-7B leaks the trained completion language into bystander directives the model was never trained on, absent under same-language SFT (LOW confidence)", clean result "Training one persona to emit a [ZLT] marker without bystanders adopting it has a one-cell-wide LR x epochs window on Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (LOW confidence)", clean result "A pretraining-data-poisoned Qwen3-4B backdoor only fires on the exact trigger tokens — paraphrases don't activate it, and base-model similarity to the trigger doesn't predict which inputs fire (MODERATE confidence)". Matching terms: under, source, token, rate, implement, compare, trained, leakage. Source: arxiv cs.CR (Cryptography and Security).